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Abstract
The existence of probability in the sense of the frequency interpretation, i.e. prob-
ability as “long term relative frequency,” is shown to follow from the dynamics and
the interpretational rules of Everett quantum mechanics in the Heisenberg picture.
This proof is free of the difficulties encountered in applying to the Everett inter-
pretation previous results regarding relative frequency and probability in quantum
mechanics. The ontology of the Everett interpretation in the Heisenberg picture is
also discussed.
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1 Introduction
The Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics [1] posits that all physical phenomena
can be described by unitary time evolution. In the standard Copenhagen interpretation
of quantum mechanics (see, e.g., [2]), the phenomenon of probability arises by virtue of
“reduction of the wavefunction,” an explicitly nonunitary type of time evolution which,
when measurements are made, supplants the unitary evolution that otherwise occurs. A
challenge for the Everett interpretation is, therefore, to show that it predicts the existence
of probability in the context of completely unitary time evolution.
∗This work was sponsored by the Air Force under Air Force Contract F19628-00-C-0002. Opinions,
interpretations, conclusions, and recommendations are those of the author and are not necessarily endorsed
by the U.S. Government.
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Probability, whether in a quantum-mechanical or classical context, has two character-
istic aspects[3]. One of these is randomness , the fact that the result of one repetition of
an experiment cannot in general be predicted with certainty. Everett quantum mechanics
predicts and explains the existence of randomness in a straightforward manner. Suppose
an experimenter, Alice, performs a quantum experiment to measure an observable with
two possible outcomes, “up” and “down.” After Alice has performed the experiment and
measured the observable, there exist two noninteracting copies of Alice, each having the
same memories as the other except with regard to the result of the experiment—we may
call them “Alice-who-saw-up” and “Alice-who-saw-down.” To the question of which Alice
is the “real Alice,” the unequivocal answer is, “both are.” Thus, in the Everett interpreta-
tion, the question “which result will Alice see” does not even in principle have an answer.
(See discussion and references in [4]).
The other characteristic aspect of probability referred to above is the regularity of the
relative frequency of the results of an experiment when it is repeated a large number of times
or, equivalently, when a large ensemble of identical experiments are performed. “Whenever
we say that the probability of an event E with respect to an experiment E is equal to P ,
the concrete meaning of this assertion [is] the following: In a long series of repetitions of
E , it is practically certain that the [relative] frequency of E will be approximately equal to
P . . . This statement will be referred to as the frequency interpretation of the probability
P [3, pp. 148-9].” Or, more succinctly, probability is “the theoretical value of long range
relative frequency [5, p. 58].”
These two properties are equally true of probability whether the setting is quantum or
classical. In the case of quantum-mechanical probability, there is another key property:
namely, the Born rule for the value of the probability. The possible results of a measurement
corresponding to an operator â are the eigenvalues αi of â,
â|αi〉 = αi|αi〉, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (1)
The probability P (αi) of measuring the result αi when, immediately before the measure-
ment, the system being measured is in the state
|ψ0〉 = c1|α1〉+ . . .+ cn|αn〉, (2)
where the ci’s are complex numbers satisfying
n∑
i=1
|ci|
2 = 1, (3)
is given by the Born rule
P (αi) = |ci|
2. (4)
(We assume here and in the remainder of this paper that the αi are nondegenerate.)
A proof has been presented by Hartle[6] that probability, as characterized by the above-
mentioned properties, exists in unitary quantum mechanics without having to be incorpo-
rated via wavefunction reduction. (See also [7].) This proof makes use of the interpretive
rule of quantum mechanics which states that if a system is in an eigenstate corresponding
the eigenvalue αi of the operator â, then a measurement of the observable â on the system
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will with certainty yield the result αi. Hartle makes use of operators f̂N (αi), i = 1, . . . , n,
corresponding to the measurement of the relative frequency of the result αi in an ensemble
of N identical systems (i.e., the fraction of systems in the ensemble in which the result
αi is obtained upon measurement) [6, 8], and shows that, in the limit N → ∞, the state
vector of the entire ensemble
|ψN〉 = |ψ
(1)〉|ψ(2)〉 . . . |ψ(N)〉 (5)
(where each |ψ(p)〉 is of the form (2) with the same ci’s) approaches an eigenstate of the
relative frequency operators f̂N(αi) with respective eigenvalues given by the Born rule (4):
lim
N→∞
f̂N(αi)|ψN 〉 = |ci|
2 lim
N→∞
|ψN〉. (6)
Farhi, Goldstone and Gutmann[9] prove a similar result working from the outset in the
N =∞ Hilbert space
As has been pointed out by Kent[10] and by Zurek[11], these proofs do not demonstrate
that the phenomenon of probability exists in the Everett version of quantum mechanics.
That is because, in the Everett interpretation, the state vector (5) is the state vector of the
entire “multiverse” [12] and describes all the Everett branches at once. The state vector
(5), using (2), is equal to
|ψN〉 =
n∑
i(1)=1
. . .
n∑
i(N)=1
cr11 . . . c
rn
n |i
(1), . . . , i(N)〉, (7)
where
ri = ri(i
(1), . . . , i(N)) =
n∑
p=1
δi,i(p) (8)
is the number of factors of eigenvalue-i states in a given term in (7), and where each of the
nN states
cr11 . . . c
rn
n |i
(1), . . . , i(N)〉 = cr11 . . . c
rn
n |αi(1)〉 . . . |αi(N)〉, (9)
is termed a “branch” of the overall state vector (7). In the Everett interpretation, as
usually formulated in terms of state vectors, each branch (9) is deemed to correspond to a
distinct physical reality. If an observer O measures each of the N systems in the ensemble,
the state vector describing the observer and the ensemble is, after the measurement has
taken place,
|O, ψN〉 =
n∑
i(1)=1
. . .
N∑
i(N)=1
cr11 . . . c
rn
n |O; i
(1), . . . , i(N)〉|i(1), . . . , i(N)〉. (10)
where the factor
|O; i(1), . . . , i(N)〉 (11)
in each branch
cr11 . . . c
rn
n |O; i
(1), . . . , i(N)〉|i(1), . . . , i(N)〉 (12)
corresponds to a distinct perception on the part of the observer, correlated with definite
measurement results for each of the systems in the ensemble.
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What must be shown to establish the frequency interpretation of probability and the
Born rule in Everett quantum mechanics is that an observer performing a relative frequency
measurement on an ensemble of independent identical systems, in the limiting case that
the number of systems making up the ensemble becomes infinite, will always (never) have
the perception of measuring a relative frequency equal to (different from) the Born-rule
probability (4). In terms of the branches (12), what must be shown is that, in the limit
N → ∞, the observer in each branch perceives the Born-rule relative frequency. The
complete state vector (10) does not correspond to an Everett branch in which an observer
has experienced specific measurement results for each of the systems in the ensemble—
else it would be of the form (12)—so demonstrating that the complete state vector is an
eigenfunction of the relative frequency operators f̂N(αi) with the corresponding Born-rule
eigenvalues (4) does not make the case that must be made.
DeWitt[13] and Okhuwa[14] demonstrate that the state vector |χN〉 which is the sum
of all of the branches experiencing non-Born relative frequencies has zero norm in the limit
of an infinitely-large ensemble,
lim
N→∞
〈χN |χN〉 = 0. (13)
Since experience inheres in individual branches, it is not relevant to the task of characteriz-
ing which experiences are or are not possible that some branches can or cannot be grouped
together so that the norm of their sum does or does not vanish. (It is true that the norm of
a branch corresponding to any particular outcome of measurement of the entire ensemble
will go to zero as the size of the ensemble, and hence the number of possible outcomes,
goes to infinity. But this is as true for branches in which Born-rule relative frequencies
are experienced as it is for branches in which relative frequencies differ from the Born rule
(4).)
Hartle and Farhi, Goldstone and Gutmann work in the Schro¨dinger picture. DeWitt
and Okhuwa work in the Heisenberg picture, but focus on states rather than operators.
Recently, Deutsch and Hayden [15] and the author [16, 17] have shown that the issue of
locality in Everett quantum theory is clarified when one works in the Heisenberg picture and
focuses on the dynamics of operators. In this paper I show that such an approach clarifies
as well the analysis of the origin of probability. In Sec. 2 below I review the formalism
and interpretive rules of Heisenberg-picture Everett quantum mechanics, and introduce a
rule which corresponds to the interpretation given to (13) by DeWitt and Okhuwa but
which is free of the above-mentioned difficulties. In Sec. 3 I show that these rules, applied
to a physically-realizable relative-frequency-measuring device—one of finite resolution, as
described by Graham[8]—lead to the conclusion that the device will, to within the limits
of its resolution, observe a result consistent with the Born rule (4) in the limiting case of
an infinitely-large ensemble. Sec. 4 contains a summary of the proof. Sec. 5 discusses the
ontology of Everett quantum mechanics in the Heisenberg picture, and comments on some
other frequency-based approaches to probability in the Everett interpretation.1
1Approaches to probability in Everett or other interpretations of quantum mechanics which use concepts
of probability other than the frequency interpretation, such as ignorance[4, 18], decision theory[19, 20, 21,
22], and Bayesian inference[23], are outside the scope of this paper.
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2 Measurement in Everett Quantum Mechanics
2.1 Schro¨dinger Picture
An observer O measures an observable ĝ pertaining to a system S. The eigenspectrum of
ĝ will be taken to finite, discrete and nondegenerate:
ĝ|S; γi〉 = γi|S; γi〉, i = 1, . . . ,M. (14)
The state space of O is spanned by L + 1 eigenstates of the operator b̂ corresponding to
the observer’s state of belief regarding the result of the measurement:2
b̂|O; βi〉 = βi|O; βi〉, i = 0, . . . L, (15)
where β0 corresponds to the state of ignorance prevailing before a measurement has been
made. We do not assume that the measurement produces a one-to-one mapping from
the γi’s to the βi’s, i > 0, but allow for the possibility that several different γi’s might
correspond to the same βi:
{βi} = {β(γj)}, i = 1, . . . , L, j = 1, . . . ,M, L ≤M, (16)
βi 6= βj, i 6= j (17)
with the values of βi otherwise arbitrary.
We will always consider situations in which the state before the measurement has
occurred, |ψ(t0)〉, is of the form
|ψ(t0)〉 = |O; β0〉|S;ψ〉; (18)
i.e., O is in a state of ignorance and S is an arbitrary state the observables of which are
uncorrelated with those of O.
If before the measurement S is in the eigenstate of γ̂ with eigenvalue γi, then the state
vector describing both O and S before the measurement is the product state
|O; β0〉|S; γi〉. (19)
By virtue of the interpretation of operator eigenstates as states in which measurement will
definitely obtain the corresponding eigenvalue as a result, the action on the initial state
(19) of the unitary operator Û corresponding to O measuring S must be to produce the
state in which ĝ definitely has the value γi and b̂ definitely has the value β(γi):
Û |O; β0〉|S; γi〉 = |O; β(γi)〉|S; γi〉. (20)
From this result and the linearity of quantum mechanics, we conclude that
Û =
L∑
i=1
ûi ⊗ P̂
S˜
i (21)
2“Observer” here can refer as well to a machine as to a human being, with “state of belief” denoting
results stored in a memory device.
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where P̂ S˜i is the projection operator which projects out those states corresponding to βi:
P̂ S˜i =
∑
j|β(γj)=βi
P̂ Sj , i = 1, . . . , L, (22)
P̂ Sj = |S; γj〉〈S; γj|, j = 1, . . . ,M. (23)
The action of ûi in the state space of O is
ûi|O; β0〉 = |O; βi〉, i = 1, . . . , L. (24)
The action of ûi on the other states of O, |O; βi〉 with i > 0, will not play a role in
subsequent analysis. (For an example of the complete action of ûi in the state space of an
observer with L = 2 see [16, Sec. 4.1].)
2.2 Heisenberg Picture
We will take the initial-time constant Heisenberg-picture state vector to be the before-
measurement state (18), and we will distinguish Heisenberg-picture operators by explicit
time arguments. At the initial time, t0, the Heisenberg-picture operators are equal to the
corresponding Schro¨dinger-picture operators:
ĝ(t0) = ĝ, (25)
b̂(t0) = b̂. (26)
At time t1, after the measurement has taken place,
ĝ(t1) = Û
†ĝÛ , (27)
b̂(t1) = Û
†b̂Û . (28)
Using (21)-(23), (27) and (28), we find that
ĝ(t1) = ĝ, (29)
b̂(t1) =
L∑
i=1
b̂i ⊗ P̂
S˜
i (30)
where
b̂i = û
†
i b̂ûi, (31)
so
b̂i|O; β0〉 = βi|O; β0〉. (32)
The fact that at time t1 the operator b̂(t) takes the form (30), a sum of operators in the state
space of O each of which is “labeled” with a factor acting in the state space of S, is taken
to indicate that the state of awareness of O at that time can be regarded, for all practical
purposes, as split into L noninteracting copies, with copy i perceiving measurement result
βi[16]. We will term this “interpretive rule 1.”
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To this interpretive rule we adjoin the following “interpretive rule 2”: At any time t
only those copies of O exist which have nonzero values for Wi(t),
Wi(t) 6= 0, (33)
where the “weight” Wi(t) is defined as the matrix element of the label factor between the
initial state (18) and its adjoint; in the present example,
Wi(t) ≡ 〈ψ(t0)|P̂
S˜
i |ψ(t0)〉 = 〈S;ψ|P̂
S˜
i |S;ψ〉. (34)
The condition
Wi(t) = 0, (35)
indicating that no observer-copy exists at time t who perceives measurement result βi will
play a role analogous to the condition (13) in the approaches of DeWitt and Okhuwa—with
the distinction that condition (35), for each value of i, explicitly refers to a single Everett
copy of an observer.
3 The Frequency Interpretation of Probability and
the Born Rule in Everett Quantum Mechanics
3.1 State Spaces of Systems and Observers
We consider an ensemble of N identical physical systems S(p), p = 1, . . . , N . The state
space of S(p) is spanned by the two eigenstates of an operator â(p) which acts nontrivially
only in that state space:
â(p)|S(p);αi(p)〉 = αi(p)|S
(p);αi(p)〉, i
(p) = 1, 2, p = 1, . . . , N, (36)
α1 6= α2. (37)
To each system S(p) there corresponds an observer/measuring device O(p), the state space
of which is spanned by the three eigenvectors of an operator b̂(p) which acts nontrivially
only in that state space:
b̂(p)|O(p); βi(p)〉 = βi(p) |O
(p); βi(p)〉, i
(p) = 0, 1, 2, p = 1, . . . , N, (38)
βi 6= βj , i 6= j. (39)
The observer O(p) interacts with the system S(p) in such a manner as to determine the value
of the observable â(p), as described in the previous section. The eigenvalue β0 indicates the
state of ignorance, while β1 and β2 correspond, respectively, to O
(p) having measured α1
or α2.
After these N measurement interactions have taken place—it is immaterial whether
they take place simultaneously or in any arbitrary order since, by virtue of the fact that
each measurement interaction affects a distinct system-observer pair, the operators corre-
sponding to the different interactions commute—an additional observer F interacts with
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all of the O(p) so as to determine the relative frequency of the result β1 among the ob-
servers. Since there are N observers, the possible values of a measurement of the relative
frequency are the N + 1 numbers 0, 1/N , 2/N , . . . , 1. As N →∞ the number of possible
values for the relative frequency grows without bound, and the difference between adjacent
values shrinks to zero.
As emphasized in this context by Graham[8], the resolution of any real measuring
device is finite. Suppose F queries each observer in sequence and in the end computes the
relative frequency. If the physical device F occupies a finite volume and has at its disposal
a finite amount of energy, it will be able to record at most a finite number of measurements.
Suppose, for example, it uses the directions of spins of neutrons to record the responses
of each observer O(p). As more neutrons are added to the finite volume available to F ,
more energy is required to pack the neutrons into the volume as a result of degeneracy
pressure. An upper limit on how much information can be recorded in this manner is
set by the number of neutrons which, when located within the finite available volume,
would have sufficient mass to produce a black hole with an event horizon surrounding the
volume. (The black-hole limit would, of course, apply as well to any information-storage
scheme involving bosonic degrees of freedom. See, e.g., [24] and references therein.) Of
course, existing information-storage devices have capacities well below these limits[24]. As
N → ∞, F will have to either stop recording new information from the O(p)’s or discard
old information. The situation is qualitatively no different if F updates the value of the
relative frequency after interacting with each observer. As N → ∞ the number of digits
required to record any possible number of the form (integer from 0 through N)×1/N will
grow until it outstrips the available memory.
So, we take the state space of F to be spanned by ν + 2 eigenvectors:
f̂ |F ;φi〉 = φi|F ;φi〉, i = 0, . . . , ν + 1, (40)
where, for i > 0, the eigenvalue φi is one of the possible outputs of F after it has interacted
with all of the O(p)’s,
φi = (i− 1)/ν, i = 1, . . . , ν + 1. (41)
φ0 will be taken to indicate a state of ignorance. For this purpose the only requirement is
that φ0 not equal any of the other eigenvalues (41); it will be convenient to assign it the
value
φ0 = −1/ν. (42)
3.2 Measurement Interactions
3.2.1 Measurement of S(p) by O(p)
The unitary operator corresponding to the interaction between S(p) and O(p), following
Sec. 2.1 above, is
Û (p) =
2∑
i=1
û
(p)
i ⊗ P̂
S(p)
i , p = 1, . . . , N, (43)
where
P̂ S
(p)
i = |S
(p);αi〉〈S
(p);αi|, i = 1, 2, p = 1, . . . , N, (44)
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and
û
(p)
i |O
(p); β0〉 = |O
(p); βi〉, i = 1, 2, p = 1, . . . , N. (45)
From (43), (44) and the unitarity of Û (p) it follows that
û
(p)†
i û
(p)
i = 1, i = 1, 2, p = 1, . . . , N. (46)
3.2.2 Measurement of O(p) by F
Define the relative frequency function for the result βi(p) = β1,
f(βi(1) , . . . , βi(N)) = (1/N)
N∑
p=1
δi(p),1, i
(p) 6= 0 ∀ p. (47)
The possible values of this function are
fl = l/N, l = 0, . . . , N. (48)
Define also the finite-resolution relative frequency function φ(βi(1), . . . , βi(N)) to be that φi,
i = 1, . . . , ν + 1, which is closest in value to f(βi(1), . . . , βi(N)):
φ(βi(1) , . . . , βi(N)) = argmin
φi
|φi − f(βi(1), . . . , βi(N))|, i
(p) 6= 0 ∀ p (49)
(smaller φi in case of a tie)
where the φi’s are as given in (41). It will also prove convenient to define
φ˜(βi(1) , . . . , βi(N)) = φ(βi(1) , . . . , βi(N)), i
(p) 6= 0 ∀ p (50)
= φ0 otherwise (51)
where φ0 is as given in (42).
The unitary operator corresponding to the measurement of all of the O(p)’s by F can
then be written as
ÛF =
ν+1∑
k=0
ûFk ⊗ P̂
O˜
k , (52)
where
ûFk |F ;φ0〉 = |F ;φk〉, k = 0, . . . , ν + 1, (53)
Note that ûF0 acts as the identity on the ignorant state |F ;φ0〉. P̂
O˜
k is the projection
operator which projects out those states corresponding to φk:
P̂ O˜k =
2∑
i(1)=0
. . .
2∑
i(N)=0
δ
νφ˜(β
i(1)
,...,β
i(N)
),k−1
⊗Np=1 P̂
O(p)
i(p) (54)
where
P̂O
(p)
i(p) = |O
(p); βi(p)〉〈O
(p); βi(p)|. (55)
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Using (41), (42) and (49)-(51) we see that, for any given set of values for i(1), . . . , i(N),
the quantity νφ˜(βi(1) , . . . , βi(N)) is equal to one of the values −1, 0, 1, . . . , ν. Therefore
δ
νφ˜(β
i(1)
,...,β
i(N)
),k−1
δ
νφ˜(β
i(1)
,...,β
i(N)
),l−1
= δk,lδνφ˜(β
i(1)
,...,β
i(N)
),k−1
(56)
and
ν+1∑
k=0
δ
νφ˜(β
i(1)
,...,β
i(N)
),k−1
= 1. (57)
Using these we verify that
P̂ O˜k P̂
O˜
l = δk,lP̂
O˜
k , k, l = 0, . . . , ν + 1, (58)
and
ν+1∑
k=0
P̂ O˜k = 1. (59)
From (52), (58) and the unitarity of ÛF it follows that
ûF†k û
F
k = 1, k = 0, . . . , ν + 1. (60)
3.2.3 Complete Measurement Transformation Operator
The unitary operator corresponding to all the O(p)’s measuring their S(p)’s, followed by F
measuring all the O(p)’s and determining the relative frequency of β1 observations, is
Û = ÛF ÛO, (61)
where
ÛO = ⊗
N
p=1Û
(p). (62)
3.3 Post-Measurement Heisenberg-Picture Operators
3.3.1 â(p)(t1)
After measurement,
â(p)(t1) = Û
† â(p) Û , (63)
or, using (61),
â(p)(t1) = Û
†
O Û
†
F â ÛF ÛO. (64)
From (52)-(55) we see that ÛF doesn’t act in the state space of S
(p), so
[ÛF , â
(p)] = 0, (65)
and (64) can be written as
â(p)(t1) = Û
†
O â
(p) ÛO (66)
=
(
⊗Nq=1Û
(q)†
)
â
(
⊗Nr=1Û
(r)
)
(67)
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using (62). From (43)and (44) we see that Û (q) only acts nontrivially on â(p) for q = p, so,
using (43), (67) becomes
â(p)(t1) =
 2∑
i(p)=1
û
(p)†
i(p)
⊗ P̂ S
(p)
i(p)
 â(p)
 2∑
j(p)=1
û
(p)
j(p)
⊗ P̂ S
(p)
j(p)
 . (68)
Since
â(p) =
2∑
k(p)=1
αk(p)P̂
S(p)
k(p) , (69)
it follows from (68), (44) and (46) that â(p)(t) is unchanged by the measurement process,
â(p)(t1) = â
(p). (70)
3.3.2 b̂(p)(t1)
After measurement,
b̂(p)(t1) = Û
† b̂(p) Û . (71)
Using (61),
b̂(p)(t1) = Û
†
O Û
†
F b̂
(p) ÛF ÛO, (72)
or
b̂(p)(t1) = Û
†
O X̂
(p)
b ÛO, (73)
where the intermediate quantity X̂
(p)
b is defined as
X̂
(p)
b = Û
†
F b̂
(p) ÛF . (74)
From (74) and (52),
X̂
(p)
b =
(
ν+1∑
k=0
ûFk ⊗ P̂
O˜
k
)
b̂(p)
(
ν+1∑
l=0
ûFl ⊗ P̂
O˜
l
)
(75)
=
ν+1∑
k,l=0
2∑
i=0
ûF†k û
F
l ⊗ βiP̂
O˜
k P̂
O(p)
i P̂
O˜
l (76)
since
b̂(p) =
2∑
i=0
βiP̂
O(p)
i . (77)
Using (54)-(56)
P̂ O˜k P̂
O(p)
i P̂
O˜
l = δk,l
2∑
i(1)=0
. . .
2∑
i(N)=0
δi(p),i δνφ˜(β
i(1)
,...,β
i(N)
),k−1
⊗Nq=1 P̂
O(q)
i(q) . (78)
Using (78), (56) and (77) in (76),
X̂
(p)
b = b̂
(p). (79)
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Using (79), (43), (44), (46) and (62) in (73),
b̂(p)(t1) =
2∑
i=1
b̂
(p)
i ⊗ P̂
S(p)
i , (80)
where
b̂
(p)
i = û
(p)†
i b̂
(p)û
(p)
i . (81)
3.3.3 f̂(t1)
After measurement,
f̂(t1) = Û
† f̂ Û . (82)
Using (61),
f̂(t1) = Û
†
O Û
†
F f̂ ÛF ÛO, (83)
or
f̂(t1) = Û
†
O X̂f ÛO, (84)
where the intermediate quantity X̂f is defined as
X̂f = Û
†
F f̂ ÛF . (85)
Using (52) and (58), (85) becomes
X̂f =
ν+1∑
k=0
ûF†k f̂ û
F
k ⊗ P̂
O˜
k . (86)
Using this in (84),
f̂(t1) =
ν+1∑
k=0
f̂k ⊗ L̂k, (87)
where
f̂k = û
F†
k f̂ û
F
k , k = 0, . . . , ν + 1, (88)
and
L̂k =
2∑
i(1)=1
. . .
2∑
i(N)=1
((
⊗Np=1û
(p)†
i(p)
)
P̂ O˜k
(
⊗Nq=1û
(q)
i(q)
))
⊗Nr=1 P̂
S(r)
i(r) , k = 0, . . . , ν + 1. (89)
3.4 Initial State
For the constant Heisenberg-picture state we take the product state in which F and the
O(p)’s are ignorant and each of the S(p)’s is in a superposition of |S(p);α1〉 and |S
(p);α2〉
with the same coefficients:
|ψ(t0)〉 = |F ;φ0〉
N∏
p=1
|O(p); β0〉
N∏
q=1
|S(q);ψ0〉, (90)
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where
|S(q);ψ0〉 = c
(q)
1 |S
(q);α1〉+ c
(q)
2 |S
(q);α2〉, q = 1, . . . , N, (91)
with
c
(q)
1 = c1, c
(q)
2 = c2 ∀ q, (92)
|c1|
2 + |c2|
2 = 1. (93)
3.5 Weights
Using (90), the definition of the weight in Sec. 2.2 and the results of Secs. 3.3.1 - 3.3.3 we
see that the weights associated with â(p) both before and after measurement, and with b̂(p)
and f̂ before measurement, are simply unity. All of these operators are of the form (30)
only in a trivial sense.
After measurement, b̂(p) and f̂ are nontrivially in the form (30). The weight associated
with b̂
(p)
i is, according to (80),
W
(p)
b,i (t1) = 〈ψ(t0)|P̂
S(p)
i |ψ(t0)〉, i = 1, 2, p = 1, . . . , N. (94)
Using (44) and (90)-(92), we find
W
(p)
b,i (t1) = |ci|
2, i = 1, 2, p = 1, . . . , N, (95)
which is nonzero for any value of N and for both values of i, unless either c1 = 0 or c2 = 0.
From (87), the weight for f̂k is
Wf,k(t1) = 〈ψ(t0)|L̂k|ψ(t0)〉. (96)
Using (89), (90)-(92), (45), (54), and (55),
Wf,k(t1) =
2∑
i(1)=1
. . .
2∑
i(N)=1
δ
νφ˜(β
i(1)
,...,β
i(N)
),k−1
N∏
r=1
|ci(r)|
2, k = 0, . . . , ν + 1. (97)
From (41), (42), and (49)-(51), we see that, for any value of N , Wf,k(t1) vanishes for k = 0,
Wf,0(t1) = 0 ∀ N. (98)
So, at t1, there is no Everett copy of the relative-frequency observer F who has the percep-
tion of being in a state of ignorance. This is of course what we expect to find, given that
we have defined the evolution operators Û (p) to measure the states of the S(p)’s without
error, and the evolution operator ÛF to accurately determine the O
(p)’s measurements and
compute the appropriate finite-resolution frequency φi.
For k = 1, . . . , ν + 1,
Wf,k(t1) =
2∑
i(1)=1
. . .
2∑
i(N)=1
δνφ(β
i(1)
,...,β
i(N)
),k−1
N∏
r=1
|ci(r)|
2. (99)
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Using (49)-(51), (57), (92), (93) and the binomial theorem, we verify that
ν+1∑
k=1
Wf,k(t1) = 1. (100)
Using (41) and (47)-(51) in (99), we obtain
Wf,k(t1) =
∑
l | 0≤l≤N, N(φk−(1/2ν))<l≤N(φk+(1/2ν))
pN,l (101)
where
pN,l =
N !
l!(N − l)!
|c1|
2l|c2|
2(N−l). (102)
To evaluate (101) in the limit N → ∞ we make use of Bernoulli’s law of large numbers.
From [25, p.195], for example, we have, in our notation,
lim
N→∞
SN = 0, (103)
where
SN =
∑
l | 0≤l≤N, |l−N |c1|2|>Nǫ
pN,l. (104)
(The value of ǫ in (104) is independent of N .) This is true for every positive number ǫ.
From (102) we see that
pN,l ≥ 0 ∀ N, l. (105)
Therefore, in (104), we can, for each N , replace the sum over all integers l between 0 and
N inclusive satisfying |l − N |c1|
2| > Nǫ with the sum over an arbitrary subset {l}N of
these integers. That is,
lim
N→∞
S˜N = 0, (106)
where
S˜N =
∑
{l}N | 0≤l≤N, |l−N |c1|2|>Nǫ
pN,l, (107)
since |S˜N | ≤ |SN | ∀ N .
Suppose |c1|
2 is closer to the finite resolution relative frequency φk′ than to any other
φk, k = 1, . . . , ν + 1,
k′ = argmin
k
|φk − |c1|
2|. (108)
For concreteness say that |c1|
2 is less than φk′,
|c1|
2 = φk′ −∆, (109)
where
0 < ∆ <
1
2ν
. (110)
(See Fig. 1.) Consider now the expression (101) for the weight Wf,k′′(t1), where
k′′ = k′ − 1. (111)
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| ← 1
2ν
→ | ← 1
2ν
→ | ← 1
2ν
→ | ← 1
2ν
→ |
φk′′ |c1|
2 φk′
|←∆→|
Figure 1: Finite resolution relative frequencies φk′′, φk′ and Born-rule probability |c1|
2 in
the case that |c1|
2 < φk′.
The values of l which enter into the sum in (101), for k = k′′, are bounded above by
lub = N
(
φk′′ +
1
2ν
)
. (112)
Therefore, using (41), (109), (111) and (112), the values that the quantity |l−N |c1|
2| can
take for any l appearing in the sum in Wf,k′′(t1) are bounded below by
|lub −N |c1|
2| = N
(
1
2ν
−∆
)
. (113)
So, for any positive ǫ such that
ǫ <
(
1
2ν
−∆
)
(114)
the sum in (101) is of the form (107), implying, by (106),
lim
N→∞
Wf,k′′(t1) = 0. (115)
For k 6= k′′ or k′, allowed values of l in the sum in the expression (101) for Wf,k(t1) are
bounded away from N |c1|
2 even more strongly, so the same argument applies, as it does
also in the case that |c1|
2 > φk′. So, we conclude that
lim
N→∞
Wf,k(t1) = 0, k 6= k
′. (116)
The above analysis does not apply to Wf,k′(t1) since, for fixed ǫ, the sum will include
values of l approaching closer to N |c1|
2 than Nǫ for N sufficiently large, no matter how
small a fixed value of ǫ is used. From (100) and (116) we see that
lim
N→∞
Wf,k′(t1) = 1. (117)
In the case that |c1|
2 is precisely equidistant from two adjacent φk’s,
|c1|
2 = φk< +
1
2ν
= φk> −
1
2ν
, (118)
k> = k< + 1, (119)
the argument above goes through for all k 6= k< or k> to show that
lim
N→∞
Wf,k(t1) = 0, k 6= k
< or k>. (120)
15
Using (100), we therefore conclude
lim
N→∞
(Wf,k<(t1) +Wf,k>(t1)) = 1. (121)
In the case that |c1|
2 = |c2|
2 = 1/2 and ν is odd, the sums (101) for Wf,k<(t1) and for
Wf,k>(t1) are term-by-term identical except for one term:
Wf,k<(t1) = T (N) + T
<(N), (122)
Wf,k>(t1) = T (N) + T
>(N), (123)
where
T (N) =
∑
l | N( ν−22ν )<l<
N
2
N !
2N l!(N − l)!
, (124)
T<(N) =
N !
2N
([
N
2
]
!
)2 , N even, (125)
= 0 otherwise, (126)
and
T>(N) =
N !
2N
[
N
(
ν−2
2ν
)]
!
[
N
(
ν+2
2ν
)]
!
, N
(
ν + 2
2ν
)
is an integer > 0 (127)
= 0 otherwise. (128)
From Stirling’s formula,
lim
N→∞
T<(N) = lim
N→∞
T>(N) = 0. (129)
Using (121)-(123) and (129),
lim
N→∞
T (N) = 1/2. (130)
(The limit of a sum of sequences is the sum of the limits of those sequences; see, e.g., [26,
p. 49]). We conclude from (122), (123), (129) and (130) that
lim
N→∞
Wf,k<(t1) = lim
N→∞
Wf,k>(t1) = 1/2 6= 0. (131)
So, in the limiting case of an infinitely large ensemble of identical systems measured by
an observer F performing a real (finite-resolution) relative-frequency measurement there
is, after measurement, either a single Everett copy of F who perceives that finite-resolution
relative frequency φk closest to the Born-rule value |c1|
2, or two Everett copies of F who
respectively perceive one of the two φk’s closest to |c1|
2.
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4 Summary
Premises:
1. Definition of measurement situation:
(a) The initial state of observer and observed system is of the uncorrelated form
(18).
(b) The interaction between observer and system leaves the Heisenberg-picture op-
erator corresponding to the state of belief of the observer in the form (30).
(c) The observer has finite resolution, i.e., is capable of perceiving a discrete finite
set of possible outcomes.
2. Interpretation of operators after measurement:
(a) Each of the terms in (30) corresponds to a copy of the observer with a distinct
perception of the outcome of the measurement; with the proviso that
(b) Only those copies with nonzero weight (see Sec. 2.2) exist.
Conclusions:
1. After the measurement of relative frequency, in the limiting case of an infinitely
large ensemble of measured systems, the only existing Everett copies of an observer
measuring relative frequency will perceive results equal to the Born rule values, to
within available resolution.
2. If one defines probability in accord with the frequency interpretation (see Sec. 1),
then probability exists in Everett quantum mechanics, in that both randomness and,
given any particular experiment (as specified by the initial state), an essentially
unique limiting value for the measured relative frequency of an outcome in an en-
semble of identical experiments, exist.
5 Discussion
The above analysis has been limited to “measurement situations.”3 It may be possible to
generalize it to apply to a broader class of situations. However, it is not necessary that it
be possible to generalize it to apply to all possible physical situations. It is a hallmark of
quantum mechanics that in many situations, for many observables, probability simply is
not defined[27, 28]. (Page argues that probabilities need only be defined in the context of
situations involving conscious perceptions[29, 30, 31].)
The ontology of the Everett interpretation in the Heisenberg picture is different from
that in the Schro¨dinger picture. Consider the scenario of Sec. 3 above, and, for the moment,
3These situations are, of course, taken to be simply those which happen to satisfy certain physical
criteria. They remain subject to the unitary quantum-mechanical evolution laws, as distinct from the case
in the Copenhagen interpretation.
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the case of finite N . The Everett interpretation in the Schro¨dinger picture would describe
the situation after all the measurements have been made in terms of 2N branches of the
state vector. In the Heisenberg picture, there are two copies of each of the N systems S(p),
two copies of each of the N observers O(p), and ν + 1 copies of F . The relative frequency
observer F has interacted with all of the O(p)’s, yet there is only a limited sense in which
any particular Everett copy of F can be said to be “associated with” a particular copy of
one of the O(p)’s.
There is no requirement that such associations exist in the formalism, either from a log-
ical or physical point of view or in order that it accord with our experience. The perception
of a fact regarding the result of a measurement (or information of any other sort) must be
embodied in the state of some physical system [32, 33]; more facts require more systems,
or more states of a given system. In the scenario of Sec. 3 above there exist perceptions
of the outcomes of measurements of each of the S(p)’s as well as perceptions of outcomes
of relative-frequency measurements. To the extent that copies of one observer/measuring
device can be associated with copies of another observer/measuring device or physical sys-
tem, such associations are not necessarily one-to-one. In the present example, different
copies of F may be thought of as “sharing” those copies of the O(p)’s which are consistent
with the relative frequencies measured by the former.
Rather than a set of “parallel” or “foliated” universes[34], the situation after mea-
surement interactions have taken place has here a more complicated structure. E.g., if
the perceptions of having measured S(1),. . . ,S(N) are stored in respective cell assemblies
O(1),. . . ,O(N) in the experimenter’s brain, and the awareness of the computation of the
relative frequency is stored in a cell assembly F , then the experimenter after having made
the measurements may be visualized as a “Siamese (ν + 1)-tuplet,” members of which are
distinguished by different copies of F but share in common copies of the O(p)’s consistent
with their differing perceived relative-frequency values.
Stein [35], in criticizing Geroch’s presentation [36] of the Everett interpretation, com-
ments that “quantum mechanics will indeed predict with high probability that the statistics
of the outcomes of these experiments [on ensembles of identical systems] will deviate little
from a specifiable set of [relative] frequencies. But how, in the ordinary practice of physics,
do we go about checking this prediction? We do so by performing the experiments and
noting and counting their outcomes.” Consistent with this criticism, Farhi, Goldstone and
Gutmann allow that the relative frequency measurements in their analysis must be the
outputs of a device specifically constructed to measure relative frequency without obtain-
ing any information about the results of measurements of the individual systems in the
ensemble. In the present analysis, the individual outcomes have most certainly been noted,
by the explicit interactions with the O(p)’s, as well as counted by F .
In the Copenhagen interpretation the weight, say Wf,i(t1), is of course just the prob-
ability that the unique outcome of the measurement of f̂ is fi. The weight differs from
Vaidman’s [4, Sec. 3.5] “measure of existence of a world,” µi. The latter is equal to the
norm-squared of the Schro¨dinger-picture branch in which a definite outcome for the mea-
surement of f̂ as well as definite outcomes for measurements of all the â(p)’s and b̂(p)’s have
occurred; i.e., to the joint probability for all of these outcomes. Vaidman also introduces
the concept of a measure of existence for “I,” “the sum of measures of existence of all differ-
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ent worlds in which I exist...the measure of existence of my perception world[4, Sec. 3.5].”
If we approximate the totality of my perceptions by my perception of the single fact of the
result of the relative frequency measurement being fi, thenWf,i(t) is equal to this measure.
If we enlarge our model of “I” or “my perception world” to include my perceptions of the
measurements of the individual physical systems S(p), then, before deciding on an appro-
priate measure for “I,” we must address the question of how individual perceptions meld
together to yield our subjective sense of unified conscious self-awareness. This is a question,
as-yet-unsolved, of neuroscience[37, p. 464], and as such involves neural properties which
can be described adequately by classical physics[38]. As seen above, the lack of an answer
to this question does not in stand in the way of constructing locally-realistic quantitative
models of quantum measurement situations, their outcomes and (using infinite ensembles)
the probabilities of these outcomes.4
Regarding the N → ∞ limit: The number of post-measurement Everett copies of F
for finite N is ν + 1; for infinite N it is one or two (see Sec. 3.5). If we consider the N
measurements of the O(p)’s to be made sequentially, with F recomputing a value of φi after
each additional O(p)’s measurement (this would require a different type of interaction than
that described in Sec 3), then the weights for the non-Born-rule copies of F decrease with
each successive measurement, and these copies “finally” (at N = ∞) vanish altogether
from existence.
One can never actually experiment with an infinitely-large ensemble,5 so one will never
encounter this “mass extinction” of Everett copies. Even if it did occur for a physically-
realizable size of the ensemble, it would not be the only situation in which dynamics
dictates that an Everett copy with a certain perception cease to exist. Vaidman [18, Sec.
3] discusses a sentient neutron which enters an interferometer containing at its entrance
a beam splitter which splits the trajectory of an incoming neutron wave-packet into two
separate trajectories. The exit of the interferometer contains another beam splitter which
coherently recombines the two internal trajectories so that the neutron emerges in a single
definite direction. Immediately before the time at which the neutron wave packets within
the interferometer pass through the second beam splitter, there are two Everett copies of the
neutron, one perceiving “moving up,” the other perceiving “moving down.” Immediately
after the time at which the wave packets pass through the beam splitter, only a single
Everett copy remains, perceiving (say) “moving up.”
The analysis which I have presented here introduces additional structure into the theory
4As a candidate for an operator corresponding to “unified conscious self-awareness” one might consider,
following the pattern of Secs. 2 and 3, an additional operator acting on a (3N (ν + 2) + 1)-dimensional
eigenspace with nondegenerate eigenvalues, one of which indicates a state of ignorance and the remaining
3N(ν+2) of which correspond (via measurement interactions with the O(p)’s and F taking place subsequent
to UO and UF) to the 3
N (ν + 2) distinct sets of eigenvalues of the b̂(p)’s and f̂ . (This operator could be
defined for finite N only.) A nonzero weight for a post-measurement Everett copy of this operator would
be equal to the measure of existence of a world, µi, with specific values for the results of measurements of
â(1), . . . , â(N), and appropriate corresponding values for the results of measurements of b̂(1), . . . , b̂(N) and
f̂ .
5This fact does not pose any problems in using the frequency interpretation of probability as we have
above. Although we cannot experiment with an N →∞ ensemble, this limiting case is well-defined within
the quantum formalism, which, as we have seen, gives an unambiguous answer as to what would happen
if we could do such experiments.
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beyond the basic Heisenberg-picture formalism; namely, the notion of existence/nonex-
istence introduced through the second interpretive rule in Sec. 2.2. Other frequency-
related approaches to probability in the Everett interpretation introduce different sorts of
additional structure into the theory, such as the ideas of associating a continuous infinity
of copies[39] or minds[40, 41] with each branch of the state vector. This approach can also
be applied to Heisenberg-picture copies [16]. The number of copies in a branch of the state
vector is taken to be proportional to the Born-rule relative frequency, so at any time the
fraction of the (infinite) total number of copies which perceive any particular measurement
outcome will be exactly equal to the probability as given by the Born rule. It is an
additional assumption to say that this state of affairs, or, indeed, the corresponding state of
affairs in any other approach based on counting the number of outcomes6 (branches, copies,
minds, . . . ), is equivalent to the phenomenon of probability. Why is it of consequence to
me what other copies of me perceive? In the Everett interpretation in the Heisenberg
picture, the number of these continuously-infinite copies or minds will be proportional to
the weight. However, if one introduces the notion of the weight, one can then consider
ensembles of many such measurements, thereby obtaining the conclusions obtained in this
paper and rendering the ad hoc introduction of continuous infinities of copies, minds etc.
superfluous.
Zurek [11, Sec. 4] uses the fact that the density matrix of a quantum system subject to
environmental decoherence evolves into a form which is for all practical purposes identical
to the density matrix describing a classical statistical ensemble of quantum systems to
argue that the probabilistic interpretation of the latter can be applied to the former. (See
also [43, Sec. 20].) Since quantum mechanics is the more fundamental theory, it seems
preferable to derive probabilistic behavior purely from within the quantum theory without
invoking classical concepts at the outset.
Graham’s analysis of probability in the Everett interpretation employs two of the fea-
tures which are crucial to the success of the present approach. He explicitly includes
the dynamics of a device to measure relative frequency, and emphasizes that, on physi-
cal grounds, such a device must have finite resolution. However, he also introduces the
notion that such a device, as part of a “two step” measuring process,7 must first enter a
state of thermodynamic equilibrium after it has made its measurements, and then must
be measured by an additional observer before Everett branches emerge in such a way that
the vast majority of them correspond to perceptions of Born-rule relative frequencies. As
shown above, these additional concepts are not necessary to demonstrate the existence of
Born-rule-consistent probability in the Heisenberg-picture Everett interpretation.
6Weissman’s outcome-counting approach [42] explicitly modifies the dynamics of the theory, adding a
nonlinear process.
7It may seem that the present approach also involves two steps, the measurements by the O(p)’s and
then the measurement by F . But we could have considered a finite-resolution relative-frequency measuring
device coupled directly to the S(p)’s and reached the same conclusions. The O(p)’s were included to
demonstrate that, as discussed above, the relative frequency being measured is the familiar quantity
compatible with measurement of individual outcomes.
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